Introduction
The Triple Helix (TH) model emerged from a workshop on Evolutionary Economics and Chaos Theory: New Directions in Technology Studies (Leydesdorff & Van den Besselaar, 1994) organized with the intention of crossing the boundaries between institutional analysis of the knowledge infrastructure, on the one hand (e.g., Etzkowitz, 1994) , and evolutionary analysis of the knowledge base of an economy, on the other (David & Foray, 1994; Nelson, 1994) . How can co-evolution between the layers of institutional arrangements and evolutionary functions be conceptualized in relation to the division of innovative labor among both institutions and functions? (Fritsch, 2004; Fritsch & Stephan, 2005) While the knowledge-based system can itself be considered as an outcome of interaction among different social coordination mechanisms-markets, knowledge production, and (public or private) governance at interfaces-the Triple Helix model of universityindustry-government relations provides us with a heuristic for studying these complex dynamics in relation to developments in the institutional networks among the carriers.
The coupling to the layer of institutional networks, that is, the knowledge infrastructure of a knowledge-based system, reduces the complexity because the historical conditions limit the range of possible options. The observable events enable the analyst to specify the systems of reference in terms of initial conditions: which industries are empirically involved, and which bodies of knowledge, and what are the relevant levels of governance?
The evolutionary analysis focuses on the functions of selection environments in terms of outputs, whereas the historical analysis informs us about how institutions and institutional arrangements carry these functions (Andersen, 1994) . In the call for papers for the first Triple Helix conference, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (1995) formulated this tension between the historical and evolutionary perspectives as follows:
"Three sources of variation have been acknowledged in technology studies: (1) industrial sectors differ with respect to their relations to the technologies that are relevant for the developments in those sectors (e.g., Pavitt 1984) ; (2) different technologies induce different patterns of innovation and diffusion (e.g., Freeman & Perez 1988; Faulkner & Senker 1994) ; (3) systems of innovation (e.g., national systems of innovation) integrate and differentiate the various functions differently (Lundvall 1988; Nelson 1993) . The variations, however, are both functional and institutional. The functional communications can sometimes be codified in new institutional settings; the institutional sectors (public, private and academic) that formerly operated at arm's length are increasingly working together, with a spiral pattern of linkages emerging at various stages of the innovation process." (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1995, p. 15) .
Unlike institutions, functions are not observable without taking a reflexive turn, that is, without some specification of selection environments in terms of expectations. For example, when universities assume the functions of an entrepreneur or, at other times, of a regional innovation organizer-in addition to their traditional institutional missions of higher education and academic research-one needs to define what will be considered as 'entrepreneurship' or as an 'innovation organizer' before one can proceed to the measurement.
In a complex arrangement, functions (expectations) can no longer be expected to correspond in a one-to-one relation with institutions (observations), and therefore a set of statistics is needed for the analysis. The uncertainty between the layers operates upon the uncertainty in the institutional delineations and at the interfaces among the different functions (Table 1) .
Sub-dynamics

Functions
Wealth generation Novelty production Normative control Carriers Industry-University-Government Table 1 :
A (neo-)institutional versus an evolutionary appreciation of the Triple Helix model
At the research level and given a project, one is able to reduce the complexity by 'blackboxing' one uncertainty or the other (e.g., by using a ceteris paribus clause and/or by specifying a focus of the research). The Triple Helix framework provides an opportunity to relate the various perspectives. It allows, for example, for studies of changes in institutional arrangements from a neo-institutionalist perspective, that is, in terms of networked relations among institutions (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 ), yet also allows for the analysis from a neo-evolutionary perspective, that is, with a focus on the changes in functions (output) which one expects to be carried by the new arrangements.
The Triple Helix as a heuristic
From an evolutionary perspective, the institutions and the arrangements inform us about the retention mechanisms, that is, the fingerprints left behind by the complex dynamics.
The TH model enriches the institutional analysis and makes the task of evolutionary reflection urgent. For example, when one focuses on university-industry relations, the addition of the dimension of government raises issues like the systemic evaluation of these relations.
In the analytical model, the different perspectives of government, industry, and academia can first be spanned along orthogonal axes, and the observables can then be appreciated as interaction effects among the functions (Figure 1 authors find sector-specific knowledge content variables to be significant and recom using the sector as the unit of analysis (Pavitt, 1984) . The authors argue that the survival rate of spin-off companies is high, but that it general takes at least ten years before their rate of growth begins to accelerate. "Thus, spinning out companies is not a quick fix for government economic development strategies." T conclusion of Robert Tijssen's contribution entitled "University-industry interact university entrepreneurial science: Towards measurement models and indicators".
Examining two indicators of connectivity-(1) public-private co-authored research articles, and (2) citations of university research articles in research articles with a corporate address-across a range of countries and sectors, the author concludes th these connectivity indicators are of minor significance compared to a university's coun of location and the scale of its research activities in industrially relevant fields of science.
One interesting finding is that patenting tends to be inversely related to the pursuit of a 9 research partnership with industry. As the author argues, this result casts doubt on the appropriateness of using patent intensity as an indicator of university entrepreneurial performance.
In their study "Indicators and outcomes of Canadian university research: Proxies Their findings suggest that "Bayh-Dole Act-like regulations that occurred in the nineties in Europe have had a significant and beneficial impact". The boom in academic patents is associated with a value distribution similar to that of patents registered by the business sector. Self-citations in patents to scientific literature, that is, to the results of prior art, lead to patents of higher value. Patents thus provide a specific reflection of the knowledge-production process, while the latter has a dynamics of its own.
The dynamics of the patent production process in academia are also the subject of Martin 
The Triple Helix as an evolutionary model
In the above summary of the contributions, we noted the tensions between integration and differentiation. Case studies tend to focus on institutional integration in terms of bilateral and trilateral relations. However, selection mechanisms in market environments are by nature very different from selection mechanisms within science or technology-like career-based reputations (Whitley, 1984 (Li & Yorke, 1975; Leydesdorff, 2006a) . The systems under study can be expected to remain in transition, and the observations have to be evaluated statistically . The observable arrangements inform us about the initial (historical) conditions or, in other words, the pathways selected by the evolving systems hitherto. However, the reflexive specification of the evolutionary dynamics in terms of selection environments may enable us to propose improvements in terms of the operating mechanisms. How can three sources of variance be expected to operate as selection environments for each other, and under what conditions can the interaction terms be used for innovations?
The biological model of Darwinian evolution theory assumed variation as the one subdynamic caused by random mutations, and selection as determined by nature. In evolutionary economics, one can distinguish among different selection environments.
Variation can then be generated in the interactions among selection environments.
However, different selection environments operate asymmetrically, that is, using different selection criteria: the observable variation can thus be considered as mutual information between the systems. The selection criteria (e.g., price/performance ratios, reputations)
are system-specific. This leads to the question, "Which system is selecting in terms of what?"
In opposition to Nelson & Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory of economic change, Andersen (1994) , for example, argued that not firms but coordination mechanisms (e.g., markets) are the evolving systems. Nelson (1994) proposed considering the relations between technologies and institutions in terms of co-evolution. In a co-evolutionary model, the two sub-dynamics are assumed to operate upon each other and thus the variation in the interaction is pre-structured (Dosi, 1982; McKelvey, 1996) . A coevolution may lead to "mutual shaping" (McLuhan, 1964) and "lock-in" (Arthur, 1988 (Arthur, , 1989 if the co-variation between the two sub-dynamics at each moment of time is reinforced over time (e.g., by network externalities). When this reinforcement is considered as containing a third sub-dynamic-that is, no longer considered as a linear progression along the time axis-a Triple Helix model is generated analytically.
For example, university-industry arrangements in a small nation like the Netherlands were based in the 1950s on informal relations at the level of scholarly and engineering communities between a few large corporations (Philips, Unilever, Royal Dutch/Shell) and the (technical) universities (Leydesdorff et al., 1980) . The state supported these arrangements, but did not pursue an active S&T policy at that time. S&T policies emerged in the 1960s and 1970s alongside industrial policies and policies for higher education. From the very beginning, these S&T policies were not strictly national (Yamauchi, 1986; Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988) . For example, they were induced at the level of the OECD, and they were increasingly shaped with reference to an emerging European level (Vavakova, 2000) . Thus, national government could no longer be considered as a constant in the institutional arrangements, but multi-level governance became itself increasingly a source of variation (Kooiman, 1993; Leydesdorff, 2005) .
A system with three sub-dynamics is complex and, in principle, may contain all kinds of chaotic behavior like bifurcations, crises, strange attractors, etc. When the three subdynamics are not synchronized ex ante, they can be considered as analytically independent sources of variance. However, one can expect co-evolutions to develop continuously between each two of them, that is, at interfaces (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986 ).
Co-evolutions develop along trajectories with the possibility of "lock-in." A system with three sub-dynamics selects upon these trajectories like a regime, given the historical 13 configuration. Thus, another cycle is added (Schumpeter, 1939; Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Freeman & Perez, 1988) . While co-evolutions between selection environments can stabilize technological trajectories in processes of mutual shaping, the additional degree of freedom in a system with three sub-dynamics may lead to de-stabilization, meta-stabilization, and globalization ( Figure 2 ). For example, when decreasing marginal return are replaced with increasing marginal returns-as some authors have suggested for the case of information technologies and services (Arthur, 1988; Barras, 1990 )-the valley provided for the trajectory at the minimum of the hyperbola (Figure 2a ; Sahal, 1985) can become a hilltop in the model given the change in the sign of the feedback (Figure 2b ). At the saddle-point of the three-dimensional curve (the dashed line in Figure 2b ), a system can be expected to bifurcate. When the three selection mechanisms operate with different parameters (Figure   2c ), the resulting system will tend to be locked-in to sub-optima. However, if the hill is climbed-using a trajectory-the system can also reach another basin of attraction (Leydesdorff, 2006b) .
From this abstract perspective of complex-systems theory, a co-evolution along a trajectory reduces complexity and thus enables the system to move from one basin of attraction to another. For example, a dominant design in aircraft development like the DC3 (1936) generated first the regime of civil aviation, while the development of widebody aircrafts with jet engines (since the introduction of the Boeing 707 in 1957) generated the regime of transatlantic mass-transportation and tourism using charter planes in the decades thereafter (Frenken & Leydesdorff, 2000; Sahal, 1985) . Historical conditions force us to reduce the analytically possible complexity along a contingent trajectory that can serve competitors as a pathway during hill-climbing. When a next plateau is reached, the old regime is left behind and the relevant selection environments are redefined (Teubal, 1979) . For example, when the VCR was replaced with the DVD, the previous lock-in of VHS versus Betamax (Arthur, 1988) rapidly became irrelevant.
The evolutionary drive in Triple Helix transitions
In an economic model of this complex system, the attractors of development are markets (or non-market selection environments), because these diffusion dynamics drive the systems with expectations of profit. However, diffusion dynamics may destabilize a hitherto coevolving system-for example, of production and distribution (Callon et al., 2002 )-when the diffusion parameter becomes relatively large (Rashevsky, 1940; Turing, 1952) . A saddle point (the dashed line in Figure 2b ) is then generated in the phase space and thus a bifurcation can be expected.
For example, in regional innovation systems like Italian districts, a co-evolution between the knowledge-production function and local markets can first carry an innovation along its trajectory. As the innovation matures and volume is generated on the market, an additional diffusion dynamics may become relevant. For example, a multinational corporation may buy the local firm that produces the innovated products, and then 15 relocate production facilities for geographical reasons. The diffusion dynamics thus dissolves the previous co-evolution along a trajectory in a next stage. The innovation that was previously stabilized in a specific region, can thus be globalized at the level of the market.
The innovative district remains under this threat of de-industrialization because the innovated system can be expected to contain a dynamics different from the innovating one (Beccatini, 2003) . Consequently, new innovations would continuously have to be generated. A specific combination of local institutions and the knowledge-production function (e.g., in Silicon Valley) may be sufficiently complex to counter this deindustrialization threat with further innovations (Nowak & Grantham, 2000; Etzkowitz & Klofsten, 2005; Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006) . However, this need of continuous innovations drives the system(s) into becoming knowledge-based. The knowledge-based systems transform the institutional conditions increasingly into a knowledge infrastructure or, in other words, a Triple Helix network of university-industrygovernment relations.
Normative implications
Along the lines of the "Mode 2" thesis (Gibbons et al., 1994) , the Triple Helix model has sometimes been understood as a plea for blurring the boundaries between universities, industry, and government (e.g., Raman, 2005) . In our opinion, this normative use of the Triple Helix model can be appreciated with hindsight as a specific reaction to the historical configuration that emerged in the early 1990s when the effects of the BayhDole Act made it necessary for European countries to consider new legislation about university patenting (Sapsalis et al., 2006) . In the meantime, however, patenting by universities and university staff has reached a stable level in the U.S.A. (Figure 3 ; cf. Mowery & Ziedonis, 2002) . As an evolutionary model, the Triple Helix abstracts from the institutional premises of a specific period. By considering the three selection environments as functions in the research design, the knowledge-based innovation systems can be studied as rich ecologies.
Rich ecologies are based on careful balances between differentiation and integration.
More than normatively inspired and ex ante calls for integration, empirical studies based on evolutionary models enable agents to distinguish integration from differentiation in different dimensions, and thus to contribute reflexively to the construction of competitive advantages in the knowledge-based economy by specifying new functions and institutional needs.
